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A"PEAL AND ERoR-DsosiTiON OP CAUsE-PENDrrIoN OF JUDGMENT.
-WEnxs v. C. & 0. Ry. Co., 69 S. E., 8q5 (W. VA.) .- Held, that when in
an action for personal injury this court finds that the evidence shows the
plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence, and sets aside a verdict for him,
if it clearly appears to this court that the plaintiff cannot, in fair proba-
bility, upon a new trial, show a case for recovery, and that no injustice
will be done by refusing a new trial, the case will not be remanded for a
new trial, and judgment will be rendered for the defendant.
While it is true, that an appellate court cannot, in rendering its deci-
sion, invade the province of the jury, Muldoon v. Pitt et al., s4 N. Y., 269,
yet such court, on reversing the judgment, will sometimes render final
judgment where it manifestly appears that the ends of justice would not
be promoted by remanding the cause for a new trial. Emery & Gault v.
Owings, 6 Gill (Md.), 191; Vandyke v. Vandyke, ix N. J. L., 478; Jones
v,. Telegraph Co., iox Tenn., 442. As for instance, where there is nothing
on which to ground further proceedings. Vose v. Gratty, 66 I1. App.,
472; Stein v. Stein, 44 Ill. App., 1o7. It is the general rule that, where the
facts of a case have been determined and are not in dispute, and the
only error lies in the application of the law, the appellate court, on re-
versing the judgment, need not remand the case for a new trial, but may
itself render the proper judgment, or direct the lower court to render it.
Douglas v. Anderson, 32 Kan., 350; Brown v. 0. & M. Ry. Co., 138 Ind.,
648. Where on appeal of an action for negligently causing death, de-
cedent is held guilty of contributory negligence, as a matter of law, and
no other theory appears from the pleadings, and evidence upon which the
defendant can be held liable, the appellate court should render judgment
for the defendant, though its brief merely asks that the cause be remanded
for another trial. Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Matthews, 74 S. W., 8o3
(32 Tex. Civ. App., 137). In order to justify an intermediate court in
rendering final judgment on a reversal, it is not sufficient that it is im-
probable that the defeated party can succeed on a new trial, but it must
appear that he certainly cannot. Howells v. Hettrick, 160 N. Y., 3o8.
BONDS-SIGNATURE-SFFICENCY.-CUNNINGHAM v. HAWKINS, 1-8
N. W., 223 (MicH.).-Held, that because the obligors on a bond signed it
on the back and under the form for a property justification, instead of at
the bottom of the bond proper, it does not affect their liability.
The authorities seem to be in accord with the principal case, holding
that the manner and form in which an obligor signs a bond is immaterial.
Hinsaman v. Hinsaman, 7 Jones L. (N. Car.), 5IO; Argenbright v. Camp-
bell, 3 H. & M. (Va.), z44. Thus, where the obligor signs in the place
intended for the signature of a witness, parol evidence may be introduced
to show the mistake and bind him. Richardson v. Boynton, 12 Allen
(Mass.), 138. And a bond signed and sealed before the condition, but
immediately after the penal clause, is binding. Fournier v. Cyr, 64 Me.,
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32; Read v. Drake, 7 Wend. (N. Y.), 34s. Furthermore, it is not necessary
that the signature should be made by the obligor in person, if he acknowl-
edges the instrument. Rhode v. Louthain, 8 Blackf. (Ind.), 413; Hill v.
Scales, 7 Yerg. (Tenn.), 41o. And a bond may be executed by an agent,
bis authority being under seal. Ingraham v. Edwards, 64 Ill., 526. But
where a statute requires the instrument to be subscribed, there cannot be
a valid execution of a bond as to one whose name appears in the body of
the instrument only, even if the name was written there by himself.
11,ild Cat Branch v. Ball, 45 Ind., 213.
CARRIERs-LIMITATIONS AS TO VALUE-VALIDITY.-CENTRAL OF GEORGIA
Ry. Co. v. BuTLER M. & G. Co., 68 S. E., 775 (GA.).-Held, that while a
common carrier may make a contract of affreightment embracing an actual
and bona fide agreement as to the value of the property accepted for
transportation, a mere general limitation as to the value, expressed in a
bill of lading, which is clearly nothing more than an arbitrary preadjust-
ment of the measure of damages in case of loss, will not, in any case,
exempt a carrier from liability for the true value of a shipment lost or
destroyed by the negligence of the carrier.
A contract between a carrier and shipper, agreeing as to value of
goods, and fixing price accordingly, is a lawful contract, if fairly entered
into. Hart v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co., 112 U. S., 331; Graves v. Railroad,
137 Mass., 33. However, the weight of authority in this country is in favor
of excluding negligence as an element of contract, against which good
morals and public policy forbid them to contract. Hutchinson on Car-
riers, pp. 2r, 212. II. Cent. Ry. v. Merrison, i9 IIl., r36; Mynaro v.
Railroad, 7 N. Y., x8o. But the same reasons which forbid that a com-
mon carrier should even by express agreement be absolved from liability
for its own negligence, stands also in the way of an arbitrary preadjust-
ment of the measure of damages, where the carrier is partially relieved
from such liability. Meulton v. Railroad, 31 Minn., 85. For this is but a
general limitation as to the true value of the goods, and is invalid. Rail-
road v. Chapman, 133 Ill., 96. And it was held that where both parties.
knowing the actual value of the goods, arbitrarily inserted in a bill of
lading, a less sum, grossly disproportionate to the real value, for the
purpose of limiting the liability of the carrier from the consequences of its
own negligence, the principle which relieves the carrier from liability for
more than fixed value did not apply. Railroad v. Kecncr, 93 Ga.. 81o;
Alair v. N. P. Ry. Co., 53 Minn., i6o.
CONTRACTS-OFFER-AccEl1TANCE.-POsTAL TEL. CABLE CO. V. LouIs-
VILLE CorroN SEED OIL Co., 131 S. W., 277 (KY.).-Held, that where an
acceptance of an offer is made by post or telegraph, as indicated by the
offerer, the contract is complete on the mailing of a letter or on sending a
telegram; and it is immaterial that through mistake of the post office or
the telegraph company the answer is delayed or lost.
The authorities are in accord with the principal case, holding that a
contract is complete on the mailing or telegraphing of an acceptance of
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an offer. Darlington v. Foote, 16 Fed., 646; Trevor v. Colgate, 36 
N. Y.,
3o7. Likewise, it is immaterial that through mistake or accident 
of the
carrier the acceptance is delayed or not delivered. Hunt v. Higman, 70
Iowa, 4o6; Washburn v. Fletcher, 42 Wis., 152. But any negligence on 
the
part of the sender causing a delay will vitiate the contract. Maclay 
v.
Harvey, go Ill., 525; Blake v. Hamburg Bremen Ins. Co., 67 Tex., 
i6o.
And it is well settled that the acceptance of an offer must be sent 
in man-
ner indicated by the one making the offer. Vassar v. Camp, 
14 Barb.
(N. Y.), 34x. Furthermore, the rule that a letter of acceptance takes
effect when mailed does not apply where the offer requires actual receipt
of the letter or telegram of acceptance. Lewis v. Browning, 130 Mass., 
173.
CoNTRAcrs-REscIssoN.-BELTINcK v. TACOMA THEATER 
Co., Ill PAC.;
zo45 (WAsn.).-Held, that where a contract for the display of an 
adver-
tising curtain in defendant's theater required payment to them 
by plaintiff
of a certain sum monthly in advance, defendants by accepting 
deferred
payments were not precluded from rescinding the contract on 
default in a
subsequent payment, having protested against plaintiff's course 
of dealing,
and having repeatedly threatened to remove the curtain for 
nonpayment
of installments.
Where one party to a contract declares that he will not 
perform his
part, or so acts as to make it impossible for him to do 
so, he thereby
releases the other from the contract and the obligations. 
Anson, Con-
tracts, p. 365; Wolf v. Marsh, 54 Cal., 228. But this right 
to rescind de-
pends upon whether the promise of the party injured was 
given condi-
tionally on the performance by the other of that in which 
he has made
default. Anson, Contracts, p. 366. In general a contract 
cannot be
rescinded by one party even though the other is in default, 
unless both
parties can be placed in the same situation as when the contract 
was made.
Norton v. Young, 3 Me., 30; Brown v. Witter, 
io Ohio, 142. Moreover,
if a party intends to rescind a contract because of the failure 
of the party
to perform he should give a clear notice of his intention, 
unless the
contract itself dispenses with such notice or unless notice 
becomes un-
necessary by reason of the conduct of the parties. Hennessy 
v. Bacon,
137 U. S., 78. And he must rescind promptly and 
decidedly on the first
information of the breach. Lawrence v. Dale, 3 Johns Ch. 
(N. Y.), 23.
It must be done at the time specified if there be such a timp; 
or within a
reasonable time. Kingsley v. Wallis, 14 Me., 57; Holbrook 
v. Burt, 22
Pick. (Mass.), 54
6. Otherwise the delay to rescind the contract gives up
the right. Mills v. City of Osawatomie, 59 Kan., 463. 
Where promises
are divisible, that is, where the contract contains a number 
of promises to
do a number of similar acts, a breach of one of them 
d6es not dis-
charge the other party from completing the contract. 
Norris v. Harris,
15 Colo., 226; Cohen v. Platt, 69 N. Y., 348; contra: 
Clark v. Baker,
5 Metc. (Mass.), 452; Catlin v. Tobias, 26 N. Y., 217. But 
where the term
may be regarded as essential then its breach gives the 
right to rescind.
Leonard v. Dyer, 26 Conn., 172; Nolan v. Whitney, 88 N. Y., 648.
DAMAGsPERsONAL INJURIES-MENTAL SUFFERINGs.-MERIuLL 
v. Los
ANGELES G. & E. Co., ill PAc., 534 (CAL.) .- Held, that mental 
worry,
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distress, grief, and mortification are proper elements of mental suffering
for which an injured person can recover; recovery not being limited to the
form of mental suffering described as physical pain.
The general rule is that actual damages resulting from a wrongful act
are not limited to the direct pecuniary loss sustained, but are also extended
to the mental distress which is fairly and reasonably the consequences of
the injury. Morse v. The Auburn & Syracuse R. R. Co., io Barb. (N. Y.),
621; Peoria Bridge Assn. v. Loomis, 20 Ill., 235; Ransom v. N. Y. & Erie
R. R. Co., i5 N. Y., 4x6; Morse v. Duncan, 14 Fed, 396; Muldowney v.
Ill. Cen. R. R. Co., 36 Iowa, 462; Randolph v. H. & St. I. R. R. Co., i8 Mo.
App., 6og. The extent of this remedy is largely within control of the jury,
there being no precise rule by which the injury can be measured. Coffin v.
Cofn, 4 Mass., i; Wadsworth v. Treat, 43 Me., x63. Connecticut holds
that the person injured is entitled to damages equivalent to the app. ehen-
sion and anguish of mind naturally excited by the risk and danger at the
time of injury. Seger v. Barkhamsted, 22 Conn., 29o; Master v. Town of
Warren, 27 Conn., 293; Lawrence v. H. R R Co., 29 Conn., 29o.
DEEDs-DEscRIPTION-EVIDENCE AND UNCERTAINTY.-HALL v. BARTLEM,
112 PAC., 176 (CA.).-Held, that a deed, which on its face contains two in-
consistent descriptions, either of which will identify a different piece of
property, discloses a patent ambiguity which, as a general rule, cannot be
removed by parol evidence, and the deed is void for uncertainty. Beatty,
C. J., and Sloss and Augellottis, J. J., dissenting.
In general a deed is void if the description is too vague and uncer-
tain. Webb v. Ritter, 6o W. Va., 193, 229; Gordon v. Goodman, 98 Ind.,
269. This uncertainty may naturally arise from ambiguity of description,
so as to inconsistently identify different pieces of property. Smith v.
Proctor, r39 N. C., 314; Crawford v. Verner, 122 Ga., 814; Brandon v.
Leddy, 67 Cal., 43. But to render the deed actually void for uncertainty
the ambiguity must be patent on the face of the deed. Campbell v.
Johnson, 44 Mo., 247; Mudd v. Dillon, i66 Mo., ilo. The office of a
description is not to identify the land conveyed but to furnish means of
identification. Eden v. Miller, 147 Ind., 208. Therefore, whether the de-
scription is really uncertain or ambiguous is to be determined from an
inspection of the entire description and deed, and from a construction of
the same that is not only reasonable, but tends to give effect to the deed
rather than defeat it. Walker v. Lee, 5r Fla., 36o; Holley's Ex'r v. Curry,
58 W. Va., 70. In the light of these conclusions parol evidence will not,
as a general rule, be admitted to explain, remove, or make certain patent
ambiguities, as distinguished from latent ambiguities. Storer v. Freeman,
6 Mass., 435; Holmes v. Whitaker, II9 N. C., 113. The property ought to
be identified without the help of parol testimony or arbitrary discretion
of an officer or court. Diamond Plate Glass Co. v. Tennell, 22 Ind. App.,
132. But if the deed and the intention of the parties must be construed by
the parties in some way, the court is entitled to the light of all the cir-
cumstances surrounding the parties in order to determine the property
intended to be conveyed. Reynolds v. Lawrence, 147 Ala., 216.
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DIvoRcE-ALIMONY---COUNsEL FFm.-DYE v. DYE, 125 N. Y. Sup., z
-Held, that where a marriage was void ab initio, a wife who knew of the
invalidity of the marriage, was not entitled to temporary alimony or coun-
sel fees in a suit for divorce.
It is usual, upon application by the wife in a suit for divorce, for
the court to make an allowance for temporary alimony or counsel fees
-during the pendency of the cause, if she is without separate funds, and
the husband is able to support her, without any consideration of the merits
of. the case further than that it must be prima facie in favor of the wife.
Porter v. Porter, 41 Miss., 116; Miller v. Miller, 75 N. C., 70. But the
right to such alimony or counsel fees does not, of course, exist where a
valid subsisting marriage relation never existed, and no allowance will be
made for same where it appears that the wife knew of the invalidity at
the time of the marriage. Freeman v. Freeman, 49 N. J. Eq., I2. If the
validity of the marriage is questionable, counsel fees may be allowed to
test the validity. Mann v. Mann, 75 N. Y., 614, cited and explained in
Collins v. Collins, 8o N. Y., 7. It is enough to secure allowance if there
is a fair probability that the wife will succeed in establishing the validity
of the marriage. Bowman v. Bowman, 24 Il. App., i65; Brinkley v.
Brinkley, 50 N. Y., 184. And it has been held that a wife's mere denial
under oath of the invalidity of the marriage will be sufficient to entitle her
to the allowance. Kline v. Kline, I Phila., 383. But if it appears of
record that the suit is without just or reasonable foundation, and that no
decree of divorce will be made, no allowance can be made. Collins v.
Collins, 73 N. Y., 269; Burrow v. Burrow, 74 Tenn., 499.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-PAYMENT OP HUSBAND's DEBT BY WIFE.-PAt-
RoTT v. SMITH, 69 S. E., 552 (GA.).-Held, that where a stock of goods
was sold to a husband under a contract of purchase, and the wife's money
was used to discharge the husband's obligations for the purchase of the
same, and the vendor knew that the money with which payment was made
by the husband was the proceeds of a part of the separate estate of the
wife, this was a payment of the husband's debt by the wife, although the
sale was made for a cash consideration, and the delivery of the goods and
the payment of the money therefor were concurrently made; and upon a
suit therefor, the wife could recover from the vendor the amount thus
paid.
The word "debt" includes any obligation that one is under to another
to pay money or other thing of value, and arises the very moment the
obligation is undertaken, and continues until discharged by payment. If
any time elapses between the performance of the service and the pay-
ment of the money, a debt will arise. Semble, City Council of Dawson v.
Dawson Water Works, io6 Ga., 696. The mere fact that the husband
has the care and control of the wife's property, such use and cohtrol not
being inconsistent with their common interests and their natural enjoy-
ment thereof, will not subject it to his debts. Primmer v. Clabaugh, 78
Ill, 94; Coon v. Rigden, 4 Colo., 275. However, personal property of the
wife, in the husband's possession, without notice of the wife's ownership,
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may be taken for the husband's debts. Gray V. Ferreby, 36 Ia., 146. An-
other view of the situation is to the effect that if the husband held the
wife's money, not as a loan, but for her, he was her trustee, and whoso-
ever helped him to misapply it to the husband's own debt, held what he
got as her trustee too, and when traced to his hand, he is liable therefor.
Maddox v. Oxford, 7o Ga., z79. A similar case to the one in question
says that, under the statute positively forbidding any assumption by a
wife of the debts of her husband, if, a creditor of the husband, in any
manner receives in payment of his debt, money of the wife, knowing it
to be hers, the wife can recover of him the amount so paid. Lewis v.
Howell, 98 Ga., 428.
INNKEEPERS-BAGGAGE-LIABILIT.-KAPLAN V. TITUS, 125 N. Y.
Supp., 397.-Held, that the relation of innkeeper and guest does not
terminate as soon as the guest pays his bill and leaves the hotel with the
intention of not returning, since the guest has a reasonable time in which
to remove his baggage.
An innkeeper is an insurer of the property of his guest and is liable
for its loss for any cause whatever unless the loss is caused by the act
of God;. or of the common enemy; or by the neglect or fault of the guest.
Sibley v. Aldrich, 33 N. H., 553; Mason v. Thompson, 9 Pick. (Mass.),
280; Giles v. Libby, 36 Barb. (N. Y.), 7o. This liability begins when the
baggage is received by an agent outside of the hotel, and before the person
has actually become a guest. Williams v. Moore, 69 Ill. App., 618; Dickin-
son v. Winchester et al., 4 Cush. (Mass.), 114; Coskery v. Naile, 83 Ga.,
696. His responsibility for the property of his guests extends to every
part of his house into which it is usual for such property to be taken.
Epps v. Hinds, 27 Miss., 657. It continues during the temporary absence
of his guest. McDaniels v. Robinson, 26 Vt., 3x6; Whitemore v. Harold-
on, 2 Lea (Tenn.), 312. And it continues for a reasonable time pend-
ing removal of property left in his custody by one who has ceased to be
a guest. Murray v. Marshall, 9 Colo., 482; Adams v. Clem, 41 Ga., 65;
Baehr v. Downey, r33 Mich., j63. What constitutes a reasonable time
depends upon all the circumstances of the case. Adams v. Clem, 41 Ga.,
65; Maxwell v. Gerard, 84 Hun., 537. The duty of an innkeeper after
the expiration of a reasonable time is only that of a gratuitous bailee.
O'Brien v. Vaill, 22 Fla., 627; Wear v. Gleason, 5 Ark., 364.
LIcENsEs-TAxING PROHIBITED BUSINESS-VALIDITY.-DIAMOND V.
STATE, 131 S. W., 666 (TEN.).-Held, that a business which is prohibited
by law may be taxed.
It is well settled that, in the exercise of its police power, a state
may impose a license-tax on any business or occupation. Price v. People
of State of Illinois, 193 Ill., 114; City of St. Louis v. McCann, 157 Mo.,
3o1; McDonald v. The State, 81 Ala., 279. And where the power to
license has been delegated to a municipality, it involves, as a necessary
incident, the power to prohibit without a license. Vinson v. Town of
Monticello, 118 Ind., io3. Furthermore, the fact that a business is unlaw-
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ful and cannot be licensed does not prevent the collection of a privilege
tax, as held in the principal case. Pervear v. Com., 5 Wall., 475; Young-
blood v. Sexton, 32 Mich., 4o6. But the imposition of a privilege 
tax upon
a business that is illegal does not operate to legalize the business. 
Blau-
field v. The State, 103 Tenn., 593. And the mere payment 
of a United
States internal revenue tax does not convey authority to 
carry on a busi-
ness, prohibited by a state law. License Tax Cases, 5 Wall., 
462; State
v. Funk, 27 Minn., 312. Likewise, the payment of a tax on an 
article used
in a prohibited business cannot render its use lawful. State 
v. Doon,
I R. M. Charlt. (Ga.), I.
MARRIAGE-ANNULMENT-GROUNDs.GoNDOUIN 
V. GONDOUIN, III PAC.,
756 (CAL.-Held, that a man who has been having illicit 
intercourse
with a woman prior to his marriage with her cannot have 
the marriage
annulled on the ground that it was brought about by the 
woman falsely
representing that she was pregnant by him.
The general American view is in accord with the case under 
considera-
tion and will not allow fraud to vitiate a marriage unless 
it is such fraud
as affects an essential element of the marriage relation. Crane v. Crane,
62 N. J. Eq., io; Franke v. Franke, 31 Pac., 571; Todd v. Todd, 
i49 Pa.,
6o. The fraud was not held to be so affecting an.essential 
relation when
the plaintiff was induced to marry the defendant owing 
to false repre-
sentations of pregnancy made by her, even though the marriage 
was never
consummated by cohabitation; Tait v. Tait, 23 N. Y. 
Supp., 59!. Nor
does it matter whether the representations of pregnancy are 
true or false;
Hoffman v. Hoffman, 30 Pa. St., 417, nor whether the defendant 
was
really pregnant by another man at the time of her marriage 
to a plain-
tiff with whom she had also had illicit intercourse; Donnelley 
v. Strong,
175 Mass., 517; Bartholomneiw v. Bartholomew, 14 Pa. County 
Ct., 23o.
The concealment of pregnancy at the time of the marriage, 
if such preg-
nancy was caused by the husband is not sufficient to vitiate 
the bond.
Creherne v. Creherne, 97 Mass., 33o. The only leading case 
in opposition
is Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo, 174 N. Y., 46, but there the 
facts were
extraordinary, for the defendant represented that she was pregnant 
by the
plaintiff, her future husband, when she was in fact pregnant 
by another
man, and the marriage was not performed until this child had been born,
and the plaintiff afterwards discovered that the child so 
presented to him
as his offspring was not even the child of the defendant, 
in fact, but
that of another woman.
MASTER AND SERVANT-ASSUMPTION OF 
RIsK.-PERRY-MATTHEWS-
BUSKiRK STONE Co. v. BENNETT, 93 N. E., 238 (IN.).-Held, that the
risk is not assumed within the meaning of the rule that 
debars recovery
when the injured party really knew there was some danger, 
unless the
danger was appreciated.
To charge a servant with an assumption of the risk of 
a danger it
must be shown that such servant not only knew of the defect, 
but also
appreciated the danger therefrom. Avery v. Nordyke & Marmon 
Co., 34
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Ind. App., 541. The case of Mundle v. Hill Mfg. Co., 86 Me., 400, says, a
servant does not assume a risk where he merely knows there is some
danger, without appreciating it. And Prendible v. Conn. River Mfg. Co.,
76o Mass., 131, holds that where there is nothing to show that a servant
injured by reason of a defective staging appreciated the danger from
working on the staging, he cannot be held to have assumed the risk. But
Feely v. Pearson Cordage, 161 Mass., 426, holds, where an employee is
injured by a known risk of the employment assumed by him, it is im-
material that he did not know the precise extent or character of the
injury liable to be sustained therefrom. However, Lee v. So. Pac. Ry.
Co., xoi Cal., i8, holds that an employe does not assume the risk of
injury from a defect in the machinery which is known to him, unless
the danger arising from the defect is also known or reasonably appre-
hended by him. And Choctaw, 0. & G. R. Co. v. Jones, 77 Ark., 367,
goes farther in saying, that where a servant was injured in consequence
of the master's negligence, the master in order to show that the servant
assumed the risk, must prove that the servant voluntarily subjected him-
self to the new danger with full appreciation thereof. The case of
Siegel, Cooper & Co. v. Troka, 1i5 Ill. App., 56, sums up the matter
in holding, where a servant, at the time he entered the employ of his
master, did not know of a particular defect from which his injury sub-
sequently resulted, he cannot be said to have assumed the risk, unless he
subsequently and prior to his injury learned of such defect, appreciated
its dangerous character, and, notwithstanding, remained in the employ of
his master without complaint.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURIES TO SERVANT AFTER NOTICE OF DEFE cT
GIVEN TO MASTER.-CROMER V. BORERS COAL Co., 92 N. E., 926 (IL).-
Held, that where a mine employee notified his master of the dangerous
condition of tracks for cars in a mine, and secured a promise to repair,
he is entitled to continue to work until the employer was given a reason-
able time in which to effect repairs without assuming the risk of injury.
A servant assumes the ordinary risks of his employment and is bound
to protect himself. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Skipper, 125 Ga., 368.
Although he assumes the incidental risks, he does not assume those created
by the negligence of the master. St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Tuohcy, 67 Ark., 209.
A servant is justified in continuing in a dangerous employment on the
promise of the master to remedy a defect in the place of work. Vion v.
Brooks-Scanlon Lumber Co., 99 Minn., 97; Cudahy Packing Co. v.
Shonmal. 6o C. C. A., 3o6; Swift & Co. v. O'Neill, 187 Ill., 337; Nash v.
Dowling, 93 Mo. App., 156; Spencer v. Northington, 6o N. Y. S., 873.
Because, if a servant, having a right to abandon the services because of
the danger, refrains from doing so in consequence of assurances that the
danger shall be removed, the duty to remove the defect is manifest and
imperative, and the master is not in the exercise of ordinary care unless
or until he makes his assurances good, which assurances remove all
ground for the argument that the servant by continuing the employment
engages to assume its risks. Rou.r v. Blodgett & Davis Lumber Co.,
Iii Mich., 5t9.
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PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION-URGENT NEcEssiY-IRREPARALE 
INJURY.
_MCMILLAN-KUEHNLE, 78 AT., 185 (N. J.).-Held, 
that a preliminary
injunction ought not to be ordered unless from the pressure of an 
urgent
necessity, and unless the injury or damage to be prevented, 
during the
pendency of the suit, is, in an equitable point of 
view, of a character to
cause irreparable ihjury.
The object of a preliminary injunction is simply preventive, 
to main-
tain things as they are until the rights of the parties can 
be considered and
determined after a full hearing. In re Murdock, 2 Bland 
(Md.), 461. So
an injunction requiring a party to do a particular thing, 
as to surrender
the possession of certain premises, is never allowed before 
final hearing.
Kamm v. Stark, x Sawyer (U. S.), 547. The right to a preliminary 
in-
junction is generally addressed to the sound 
discretion of the court, to
be exercised according to the circumstances of each case. 
Price v. Price,
xo Idaho, 443. There must be some affirmative ground 
shown for the
exercise of the jurisdiction. Tiller v. U. S., 51 C. C. A., 
299. A pre-
liminary injunction which in effect determines the litigation 
and gives, the
relief which it is expected to obtain by the judgment, should 
be granted
with great caution, and only when necessity requires. 
Whitney Mfg. Co.
v. Bauland Co., 56 N. Y. Supp., 114. A preliminary injunction 
to maintain
the status quo, may properly issue where the questions 
of law or fact
to be determined are grave and difficult, and the injury 
to the moving
party will be immediate and great if denied. Allison v. Corson, 
88 Fed.,
581. A preliminary injunction will not be granted where 
its denial will
involve no risk or irreparable injury to complainant. Muller 
v. Mutual,
Etc., Ins. Co., iog Fed., 278. So to justify a temporary injunction 
pending
an action for a permanent one, it must appear that the acts 
done or about
to be done by the defendant will work such injury to the 
plaintiff as can-
not be compensated, or that they will prevent a final judgment 
in the
action from being effectual. Troy & B. Ry. Co. v. Boston, Etc., Ry. Co.,
13 Hun. (N. Y.), 60.
RAILROADS-PERSONS USING-LICENSEE-DUTY OF 
RAILROAD TOWARD
PERMIssIVE WAY AcRoss.-ScHMIDT v. PENNSYLvANIA 
R. R., 18I FED., 83.
-Held, that where defendant railroad company opened a freight 
train at a
point where two paths, long and freely used by workmen 
and others,
converged crossing the track, and plaintiff, a boy of eight and a half years,
was injured while crossing between the cars through an 
opening thus
created, the plaintiff was a mere licensee, as to whom the railroad 
company
was under no obligation to give warning before the closing of 
the cut, and
was therefore not liable.
Rules differ as to the care a railroad company should exercise 
toward
mere licensees. One holds that the company owes no duty of 
protection
from negligence. Hall v. Cleveland, Etc., Ry. Co., 15 Ind. 
App., 496;
Mobile and Ohio R. Co. v. Dowdy's Admr., 28 Ky. Law Reports, 1370
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Segall's Adinx.. o5 Va., 538; 
Fury v,. N. Y. C
Etc., Ry. Co., 67 N. J. Law, 270.
RECENT CASES
Other jurisdictions hold that the company owes no duty other than
not to injure him wantonly, intentionally or recklessly. Carr v. Missouri
Poc., i95 Mo., 214; Ill. Cent. v. James, 67 Ill. App., 649, and McLaughlin v.
Chicago R. I., Etc., Ry. Co., 115 Ill. App., _62. Another rule holds that
those in charge of the trains are required to take notice of the fact of
the use by a licensee, and use reasonable precautions to prevent injury to
persons whose probable presence should be anticipated. Garner v. Trum-
bull, 94 Fed., 32r; Tutt v. Ill. Central, 1o4 Fed., 74z; Bullard v. Southern
Ry., 116 Ga., 644; McCarthy v. N. Y. Cen., 76 N. Y. S., 321; Swift v. R. R.
123 N. Y., 645; Taylor v. Delaware & Hudson, 113 Pa., i62; Harriman
v. Pittsburg, Etc., Ry., 45 Ohio St., ii.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-CONTRACT TO CONVEY LAND-PARTAL PER-
FOR ANCE-STATUTE OF FRAUDS.-COLLINS v. LEARY, 77 ATL., 5x8 (N. J.).
-Held, that where Leary, in consideration of the right to use a patented
dredging bucket, contracted to convey certain real estate to complainant
and her husband, since deceased, and in partial performance placed com-
plainant and her husband in possession, but did not convey the property.
there was sufficient part performance to justify specific performance in
equity, notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds.
In order to give a Court of Equity jurisdiction to enforce specific
performance of a contract, it must be complete and certain as well as fair,
and must be founded on a valuable consideration, and it must appear that
the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law. Louisville, Etc., Ry. Co. v.
Bodenschat-r-Bedford Stone Co., 141 Ind., 251. A parol contract in rela-
tion to land, which has been partly performed, may be established by
parol and enforced in equity, notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds.
Alexander v. McDaniel, 56 S. C., 252. Yet the parol contract will not be
enforced unless the failure to do so will work a fraud on the plaintiff.
Jayne v. Brown, 88 N. Y. Supp., 589. To justify the court in relaxing
the operation of the statute, clear and convincing proof of the contract is
essential. Boyd v. Cleghorn, 94 Va., 78o. Specific performance of an
oral contract to purchase real estate cannot be awarded where the plain-
tiff does not show full performance of the contract on his part, or tender
of performance. Clouse v. Elliott, 71 Ind., 302. Possession of the land
by the vendee under an oral agreement of sale removes the case from
the operation of the Statute of Frauds on a bill for specific performance.
Coggswell v. Coggswell, 4o At., 213. But possession under such a con-
tract must be notorious, exclusive, continuous, and in pursuance of the
contract. Baldwin v. Baldwin, 73 Kan., 39.
SPECIFIC PFRFORMANCE-PAROL GIFT OF LAND-POSSESSION AND IM-
PROVEMENTS.-WHITAKER V. McDANIEL, 78 ATL., I (M.).-Held, that
equity will protect a parol gift of land equally with a parol sale of it, if
followed by possession, and by valuable permanent improvements on the
land made by the donee in reliance on the gift.
The weight of authority, both in this country and in England, sup-
ports the principal case. Y'oung v. Overbangh. 145 N. Y., i58; Dilwyn v.
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Llewellyn, 31 L. J. Ch., 658; Coles v. Pilkington, L. R. 19 Eq., 174. Two
theories are advanced for the reason of this rule: On the one hand,
it is said that great injustice would be done the donee by refusing to grant
specific performance; Wainwright v. Talcott, 6o Conn., 43; and on the
other hand, that the possession and improvements are the equivalent of an
actual consideration. Seavey v. Drake, 62 N. H., 393; Guynn v. Mc-
Cauley, 32 Ark., 97. But the court will not decree specific performance
where the donee merely takes possession, without making improvements.
Anderson v. Scott, 94 Mo., 637; West v. Webster, 39 Tex. Civ. App., 272.
To warrant interference by a court of equity, the improvements made by
the donee must be valuable and permanent; Price v. Lloyd. 31 Utah, 86;
his possession must be actual and not constructive; Griggsby V. Osborne,
82 Va., 371; ana the possession must be taken, and the improvements made,
in reliance on the gift. Bigelow v. Bigelow, 93 'Me., 439. It is well set-
tled that the possession and improvements are sufficient part performance
to take the transaction out of the Statute of Frauds. Anderson v.
Shockley, 82 Mo., 250; Truman v. Truman, 79 Iowa, 5o6. If specific
performance is denied on account of doubt as to the proof, the court will
decree compensation to the donee for the improvements made. Worth v.
Worth.. 84 Ill., 442.
STREET RAILROADS-INJURIES-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.-ASHLEY 
V.
JOLINE, 126 N. Y. SuPP., 3.-Held, that in an action for injuries received
while crossing a street car track that plaintiff did not show herself free
from contributory negligence, there being. nothing to prevent her from
seeing car, had she looked. Gavegan, J., dissenting.
This decision is not in accord with the general rule of law on the
subject, which is that failure to look before attempting to cross a street
car track, does not per se constitute negligence, but is a question for
the jury in every case. Pyne v. Broadway Electric Ry., i9 N. Y. Supp.,
217; Benjamin s'. Holyoke Ry. Co., 16 Mass., 3. There are many cases
holding that it is negligence as a matter of law not to look before attempt-
ing to cross a steam railroad, but that such is not the case in regard to
crossing a street car track. Smith v. Minneapolis City Ry., go Minn., 254.
In some jurisdictions, however, it has been held that the same rule applies
alike to both steam railroads and street railways. Bcrgycr ',. Philadelphia
R. T. Co., 141 Fed., 1020. With a state of facts similar to the present
case, late decisions have said, without laying down any general rule, that
there was no contributory negligence as a matter of law and the facts
should go to the jury. Daut v. N. J. St. Ry. Co., 7o N. J. Law, 338;
Priesinyer v. St. Louis Transit Co., 102 'Mo. App., 518.
